India's Challenges and Responses in Counter Terrorism

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Abstract- *The War against Terrorist has emerged to be a single largest war of global scale and proportions that is being waged in the various geo-strategic and geo political theaters. The War against Terror has emerged as an asymmetric conflict that had all strategic elements of surprise, deception and denial.' In its physical nature and scope this is regarded as a military conflict and therefore the role of security forces consisting of the armed forces, paramilitary forces Special Forces aid the police forces are being tasked in a campaign no attrition against the threat. The Counter Terrorism strategy has been essentially reinforced on the primary platform of the Intelligence operations and it constitutes the mode of sustaining the spectrum of military operations that have ranged from air assaults. The nature and role of military powerin terrorism, insurgency and asymmetric conflicts have been sustained and focused. However the terror and insurgent groups have been able regroup and have morphed in different combinations. They leave been able to network in various combinations and have proved their sustained virulence.*

Keywords- war, counter terrorism, Intelligence operations, conflicts, military operations etc.,

I. INTRODUCTION

States and Terror groups have adopted asymmetric strategies to combat each other. The State and the terror groups have developed special strengths in this asymmetric combat with capabilities that have been the dominant in their respective operations. States have preferred the imperatives of hierarchical formal organizations and capabilities that rely on the systematic orchestration of resources and capabilities: terror entities have preferred the horizontal, informal networked organizations that at best are virtual entities relying on their stealthy imagery to sustain their asymmetric.

States have always preferred institutional authority that is concentrated; terror entities have been at ease with symbolic leadership patterns and diffused operating styles. The loyalty, the state is fixated in its polity,' while terror groups nurture an allegiance to a tradition.

In operational terms, the state prefers a centralized power structure with defined relationships; terror groups believe in a highly decentralized power structure with premiums on responsibilities in divergent roles. "the forte' of the State confronting terror groups relies on a proactive and offensive mode of Intelligence studded with structures and equipped with capabilities that provide a real time profile to sustain operations; terror groups have primarily defensive capabilities of intelligence operations.

In term so surprise, denial and deception, the terror groups have been able to exhibit powerful abilities to cameo flag intents and actions and these are critical to their operational success; the State apparatus sarevaried and their deployment is also effective and in useful parameters.

In terms of the evolution of strategy, doctrine and tactics, the State has formal structures, historic experience perfected by simulation and game approaches; terror entities have always been evolutionary in approach and have proceeded with trial and error. States build their force structures and evolve force postures on primary missions and it is usually a sustain reprocess.

The quantum of resources expended is quite substantial and sustained over long periods involving extensive research and development; terror entities rely on a natural selection process and they are often conditioned by frugal budgets. In terms of mission priorities, terror groups have dedicated missions of unleash of mass violence and disruption, while the state's security forces contend a whole spectrum of national security challenges in the internal mid external realm, regional security obligations and other transnational challenges. There source base of the states usually extensive emanating from a wide spectrum of tax revenues and other resources, while terror entities mobilize through contributions from the voluntary sector and other criminal organizations.

Given the wide Contrasting parameters of performance of States and terror entities, the dynamics of the conflict would be asymmetric and the outcomes of the conflicts would be increasingly toward a stalemate. The notion

of quick victories would be relative in view of the multiple theatres of operation aid the varying level of conflict. Tactical gains by the State cannot be interpreted as strategic victories. The highly adaptable and mutation capabilities of terror entities could morph and network into new variants and could strike the State with new ingenious methods. Hence the initiative to containment of terror lies in the constant tactical innovation of counter terror methods along with the sustenance of viable intelligence links that should be proactive, synergies with special operations on a sustained basis.

II. THE SCOPE AND EFFICACY OF STATE RESPONSES

In the process, two critical dimensions of the State would determine the viability of the War against Terror. One would be the viable evolution of home land defenses and the other lies in the in the increasing efficacy of better governance. Homeland defenses have emerged as the second line of defense in the War against terror. Home land defense always been construed in terms of mere policing functions and counterespionage roles in the context of the Cold war era. The War against tensor had augured a whole architecture of missions, institutions and processes that provide a seamless web to detect. Contain and intercept terror attacks and provide for a viable defense mechanism ensured in the comprehensive network of security systems that would be multi-tiered and integrated.' The architectureo1 home land defense evolves in the varying context terror challenges.

In retrospect, the architecture of homeland defenses have been at best models of improvisation and innovation involving restructure and reform of intelligence agencies, revamping of internal security institutions and the effective interface that had now come to prevail between them. The ingredients of a viable home land defense in brief forth experience accrued in the past year would now integrate the missions of evolving competing teams that would simulate terror and counter terror operations accruing insights into innovative operational parameters of contention; new methods of surveillance and sensors technology that would augment and interface in the counter terror operations; transnational intelligence coordination and the validation of information; interdiction abilities reliant on superior forces and effective targeting; coordination of state and local administrations in swift counter terror moves seem to be the emergent path ways of the roles and missions of the home land defense system.

The critical issue in the effective prosecution of the war against terror lies in the efficacy of Governance'. The political quest of terror networks is their goal of strangulation

the government through a process of sustained attrition eroding the vitals of state structures and processes. In the cumulative outcome. the collapse of governance emerges as the inevitable result. Terror campaigns sustain the anti-insurgent, counter-terror measures of the defending state resulting in colossal military expenditure, eroding state investments in the social economic sectors o1 development and the ushering of draconian legislation depriving the citizens of their basic freedoms given the overriding considerations of state security over human security. The imperative of effective governance thus emerges as a crucial issue in the War against terror. It necessarily involves the imperative to nurture political stability, social economic equity and effective political competence of the leadership auguring for the comprehensive security of the state and its citizens. The imperative to reform and restructure of the state in search of humane alternatives is perhaps the most critical deterrent to the possibilities of catastrophic mass terrorisms that eventually exposes the elements of discontent

It is thus evident that spawning of the various counter ten-or methods would have its own limitations without the effective reform of the political system equipping them with the missions to accomplish the comprehensive security of the State and the citizenry. The War against terror is asymmetric in its context, divergent in scope and purpose and elusive in targeting the terror entities given their virtual presence and effective mutations in varied circumstances. The coalition against terror and the architecture of counter terror operations is indeed monumental mobilization of human material, technological and organizational resources of the State effectively complemented by good governance and political competence.

III. THE POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERFACE

The second issue that needs to be evaluated is the appropriate manner of deployment of the various security forces including the army and the inter-institutional coordination. It is true that in the scheme of the constitution the aid to civil tasks are normally warranted in contingencies when the civil administration fails to co epacris is. In the coequal red history of this country, the requisitioning of armed forces for civil tasks that range from the conduct of elections in the "troubled states" to disaster mitigation missions to relief work have all been tasked with the army units. Such measures present a picture of the appropriate civil authorities educated forth emissions.5

While paramilitary units and special protection forces are indispensable there questioning of army units on adhoc instructions from the Minister of Defense for every crisis in

the domestic realm betrays the total inefficiency of the state police forces and the central policeandparamilitaryforces.TheeventsofDecember131reveal the hasty requisition of the army without explicit formal procedures with no clear mat1date on the nature of operations even after 48 hours of the crisis. As part of the holistic national security management, it is imperative - to streamline the process of employing the army before the next crisis strikes.

The third issue that demands the attention of the: parliamentarians both in the Treasury and the Opposition benches is the realization that in issues of utmost national importance and public policy a certain degr.ee of professional conduct and etiquette is required of them. It is a sad fact of the Indian democracy that irrespective of the party in government, the tendency of the party in government is too often blanket cloak all pubic issues of legislation in secrecy and attempt to bulldoze the same using arithmetic majority. The need for a thorough professional policy analysis is the most serious lacuna e in this country, needless to mention the lack of such professional mindset for an informed debate. Polemics, rancor and mutual acrimony have been exalted at the expense of professional and objective policy debates in the Parliament.

The fourth issue that needs evaluation is the implications of rhetoric and action in public policy. Statements such as "hot pursuit" "crossing the Line of Control" released by the executive branch of the government contain serious implications of policy and operational significance. The penchant for repeated rhetoric without substantive action or operations would in course of time erode the credibility of the implied prouncement. The seriousness of any rhetoric is normally under girded by the gravity of the action or policy implementation or operation that would reinforce the rhetoric.

The fifth imperative lies in the willingness to Observe, Orient Develop and Act (OODA) in the event of any crisis.6Each event in any crisis needs rigorous analysis by our security and policy professionals and a database should be nurtured in terms of detailed inputs and analysis undertaken in the management of such crisis. This augments our knowledge and capabilities and would enable to prefer viable policy options and operations rather than refer the ado. In the process. We need to evaluate the positive and appropriate aspects of the action and strategic behavior of other countries that would have potential lessons for us to learn.

It is essential that India needs to evolve its unique strategy and tactics in Counter Terrorism. India's strategy must be realistic and could adopt partially from the US and Israeli

models of preponderant force employment; the British surgical approach to the IRA and the Egyptian policy on eliminating the Jehad is in a sustained and focused approach that is political-diplomatic; economic-developmental and military-operational.

IV. POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

India's Counter-terrorism strategy cannot effectively be fought alone as the prevalent experience so far. India's counter- terror strategy confronting Pakistan's proxy-abetted terrorism requires the sustained counter-terror operations that require India to sustain overt and covert measures against Pakistan. India needs to sustain the constant diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

V. INTERNAL STRATEGY

India's policy of meeting political /economic aspirations has succeeded in many cases through the creation of news tats and autonomous councils with limited military containment. However, it has not succeeded where ' internal support' has been potent. We, therefore, need to move from a policy of appeasement and accommodation to firm action before the problem spreads:

India has to adopt proactive policies to confront the terrorists militarily, and at the roots of terrorist ideology - fundamentalists. social evils and sources of terrorism e.g. Narcotics /drug trade;

- Enact effective anti-terrorist laws and legal framework;
- Modernize and enlarge intelligence networks:
- Modernize state Police and Para Military forces m training. Equipment and ethos

VI. ECONOMIC DIMENSION

The imperative to good Governance with accents on economic development had to be widespread evenly throughout the country. Locate some of the Public Sector Units in the remote areas even if they are non-profit making. The need to emphasize greater developmental effort in the remote, weaker sections of society-which, though has stated policy is not visible at present is essential. The need to reduce demographic displacement resulting in social/ethnic tension such as in Assam and Tripura, through the joint development of sensitive border belts along Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The need to enhance our economic and military capabilities so as to widen the gap between India and Pakistan sufficiently, and act as an economic and military deterrence

for Pakistan, which would then realize the futility of trying to catch up.

VII. SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The imperative to evolve a moderate and secular polity by media, intelligentsia and religious institutions is a vital counter- 1error strategy. The path of developing a composite culture as already developed in the Armed Forces may serve as a useful role model. The reform of the outdated religious based education system of Madras as by quality modernization and laying down guidelines for uniform school /college curricula would be the first step in the evolution of a secular liberal-democratic culture.

We cannot continue to recognize religious education such as those in the Madras as an entrance-system for universities. Suitable alternatives have to be created. The evolution of liberal- democratic Information Order that would feature television and telecommunication spreads to our remote and border areas, which are currently under constant reach of Pakistan propaganda. There should be realistic psychological and information warfare so that the will of the anti-national elements is suffocated and the hearts of the populace are won

VIII. MILITARY STRATEGY

The imperative for India is to articulate and threat perceptions matrix and locate the context of its counter terrorism strategy / doctrine. This should tackle the causes and not just the symptoms:

The aim of military operations should create a secure and suitable environment, so that social, economic and political issues can be addressed effectively. Seeking political solutions to accommodate the aspirations without fully eliminating the terrorists, their structure and support bases only results in a 'firefighting' situation and actually prolongs terrorism. This results in enormous costs, militarily and economically;

- The first step should be to build-up the military forces and their capabilities (which are not adequate currently), and there after consolidation of these capabilities and finally destruction of the militants;
- A reactive response is not the answer. A reorientation of armed response is required so as to launch proactive and specific surgical military operations; 8
- An important element of a proactive effort is to increase the costs of proxy war to Pakistan. by undertaking 'Ho t

Pursuit Strikes' across the LoC and into Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK);•

- The evolution of a superior Intelligence System is imperative. This should encompass human. Technical, electronic intelligence, as also modernization of data processing and dissemination - both external and internal;
- Effective surveillance and management of the borders to check infiltration (International Border/ Line of Control), is also necessary. This should be achieved through technical means of surveillance. Backed by highly mobile. Specialized forces as 'Reaction capability' rather than the present system, which is manpower intensive;
- Foreign-based terrorists have to be hit at their bases, training camps and sanctuaries to end the surrogate terrorism or the proxy war by Pakistan. We have to create the means and the will to. do this. Special Forces both overt and covert need to be employed for this task:
- It is vital to create a proactive and imaginative security of our vital installations, nuclear assets and airports. Static posts or piquet's are not the answer. Electronic sensors andeffectiveintelligenceis1heneed;10
- Preventive measures against nuclear, biologic al and chemical (NBC)and cyber-terrorism.
- The Army is the ultimate weapon of the state and it's over- employment affects its operational role. The Police and the Para- military should normally handle the internal security. However, they are incapable of fighting a proxy war such as in J&K unless their capabilities are upgraded.

IX. CONCLUSION

The lacuna evident in India's Counter terror strategy is the absence of a consistent and comprehensive policy at the national level. The core of the issue is that the need to respond efficiently and rationally to the emerging challenges. 'Collective Action• to light by international cooperation is a must, as the economic costs of combating terrorism. Collective Action is also applicable at the national level. We cannot continue with the present situation where the Armed Forces bear all the responsibility of dealing with anti-national elements. While other members of society. from the safety of their homes. Advocate what they deem lo be politically correct measures. A democratic polity and a diverse society such as India do not support stringent measures and anti-terrorist legislation, even when necessary. Thus, at present the security forces have to function in an environment of lack of total physical and legal support. The combination of legal reforms and stringent anti- terrorist legislation would provide the framework of counter-terrorism. The citizens of the country also have to be energized to feel responsible for the well-being of the nation and state apparatus alone will not suffice. Simultaneously, we have to deploy Special Forces for

specific tasks and they have to be trained accordingly. There is also a need to evolve a policy framework on internal security by the Home Ministry. Ultimately, the roots of terrorism have to be removed t h rough good governance. Political corruption and lack of good governance is a basic contributor to frustration setting in into a society. this is then exploited by unfriendly nations. Needless to say, this has to be addressed immediately by striving to achieve economic well-being. Social justice and political aspirations of the Indian people.

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